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Over-reliance on pharmacy computer
systems may place patients at great risk
From the February 10, 1999 issue
Our recent computer field test and survey results resemble
conclusions drawn from a Georgetown University study on the
state of pharmacy computer systems. Published August 26, 1996
in US News and World Report, the cover story, "Danger at the
Drugstore," concludes that pharmacy computer systems in this
country are of limited reliability when used to detect and
correct prescription errors, most notably serious drug interactions.
Our findings, from over 300 respondents, show that pharmacy
computer systems need serious improvement. Many respondents'
systems performed poorly when tested with specific questions
to assess the computer's ability to detect serious or fatal
errors reported to ISMP in the previous year. Chillingly,
only 4 out of 307 systems tested detected all unsafe orders
presented in the field test.
It's frightening that the majority of our nation's pharmacy
computer systems may be incapable of detecting orders that
exceed a set maximum dose. Yet, only about 38% of respondents'
systems detected lethal overdoses of both cisplatin (204 mg
for a 26 kg child) and vincristine (3 mg for a 2 year old).
Only about 34% detected lethal colchicine doses (both single
and cumulative). 87% did not detect an excessive antibiotic
dose for a patient with renal impairment (tobramycin 120 mg
IV q8h for a patient whose creatinine clearance was 10 mL/min).
Only 42% of the respondents' systems are even linked between
the pharmacy and laboratory to obtain this important information!
Moreover, less than half (41%) of the linked systems automatically
screen orders against current laboratory values to alert staff
to drug therapy concerns. Respondents' systems fared somewhat
better detecting a ketorolac and aspirin cross allergy (88%),
drug interaction between ketoconazole and cisapride (85%)
and therapeutic class duplication with famotidine and nizatidine
(82%). However, only 35% detected drug ingredient duplication
with acetaminophen and Percocet. Also, just 39% alerted staff
or blocked entry for an oral suspension ordered IV or would
not allow the order to be entered at all.
On the plus side, 75% of respondents considered the interaction
warnings appearing during order entry to be clinically significant
or easily eliminated if considered insignificant. However,
with the exception of a warning or blocked entry for an oral
suspension by IV route, most respondents' systems require
no staff action (such as entering a password) to ensure that
the warning is acknowledged. Thus, each warning can be bypassed
simply by pressing a function key and may be overlooked by
those working under pressure.
The most common computer vendors used by respondents include
HBOC (27%), Meditec (16%), Cerner (10%), SMS (6%), Pharmakon
(6%), and Digimedics (6%). The most frequent drug information
providers include First Data Bank (61%), Medispan (25%) and
Medicom (7%). When results for each vendor's computer system
and drug information provider were analyzed separately, no
computer system or drug information provider was better than
another at detecting unsafe orders. Each had significant limitations
similar to those listed above. Also, respondents at different
sites using the same vendor's computer system and/or drug
information provider reported considerable variation in the
ability to detect unsafe orders. This is likely due to differing
system applications, variations in maximizing system capabilities,
and varying frequency of receiving/integrating drug information
updates. While most respondents reported that they receive
and integrate drug information updates either monthly (36%;40%)
or quarterly (48%;54%), 3% of respondents reported that they
never receive drug information updates and 8% reported that
they never integrate the information! Additionally, almost
one third of respondents indicated that it would take six
months (22%) to one year or longer (9%) to integrate new drug
interactions reported by the FDA.
Although no system detected unsafe orders significantly better
than others, Meditec users consistently reported a higher
level of additional system capabilities when compared to other
systems. These included the ability to build alerts for error
prone situations (84%); produce warning override reports (94%);
provide clinically significant drug interaction alerts or
eliminate insignificant alerts (88%); produce computer generated
MARs (92%) to their satisfaction (81%); directly link with
the laboratory system (78%) and automatically screen orders
(50%); integrate inpatient and outpatient records (79%); direct
physician order entry capability (27%); and satisfaction with
vendor support (71%). However, users also reported frustration
with the complexity of the system. Overall, including all
vendors' systems, respondents reported the lowest capability
for integrating inpatient and outpatient records (37%) and
direct physician order entry (13%).
While pharmacy computer systems have become a common and
essential professional tool to increase staff efficiency and
support effective drug therapy monitoring, our study shows
that pharmacists must not rely on this tool alone. Vendors
may market systems by promoting the detection of unsafe orders.
Yet, it is clear that, in practice, complex self-programming
and the unrealistic time commitment necessary to achieve desired
results may prohibit full use of the systems' capabilities.
Thus, such vendor claims are meaningless unless the system
applications are user friendly, allow maximum capabilities
to easily be achieved, and they are not cost prohibitive.
Nonetheless, with 69% of respondents reporting that their
systems allow them to build alerts, it is crucial to maximize
a systems' capabilities whenever possible by responding to
serious error prone situations reported in the ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Meanwhile, we plan to use the survey results
to promote improved pharmacy computer technology for more
effective recognition of subtherapeutic and excessive doses,
allergic and cross allergic reactions, drug class and ingredient
duplication, drug interactions, and contraindicated drugs
or those needing dose adjustment for specific diseases or
other clinical situations. We thank all who responded to the
survey to make this goal a reality.
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Table I: Unsafe Drug
Order and Test Patient Parameters, if applicable
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Unsafe order not detected
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Can override without note
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1. cephradine oral suspension IV
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61%
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36%
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2. ketorolac 60 mg IV (aspirin allergic patient)
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12%
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64%
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3. vincristine 3 mg IV for one dose (2-year-old)
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62%
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56%
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4. colchicine 10 mg IV for one dose (adult patient)
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66%
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55%
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5. cisplatin 204 mg IV for one dose (26 Kg child)
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63%
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62%
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6. nizatidine 300 mg hs (patient on famotidine)
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18%
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71%
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7. colchicine 1 mg IV q4h for 8 doses
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70%
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62%
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8. ketoconazole 200 mg daily (patient on cisapride)
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15%
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67%
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9. tobramycin 120 mg IV q8h (Ccr = 10 mL/min)
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87%
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73%
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10. acetaminophen (patient on Percocet)
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35%
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68%
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Table 2:
Statements
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Yes
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1. The system allows you to build alerts
for error prone
situations (i.e. look-alike
names; labeling problems) |
69% (313) |
2. The system is capable of providing
management with
regular reports of drug warning
overrides by staff. |
79% (309) |
3. Drug interaction alerts without clinical
significance are
not present or are easily eliminated. |
74% (313) |
| 4. The system produces computer generated
or electronic MARs. |
88% (31) |
| nbsp; a. Would nursing
staff give the MARs a positive rating? |
74% (246) |
| 5. The system is directly interfaced
with the laboratory system. |
43% (317) |
a. The system
automatically screens orders and alerts staff
according to current
laboratory values. |
20% (292) |
| 6. The system integrates inpatient and
outpatient records. |
37% (310) |
| 7. The system currently allows for direct
physician order entry. |
13% (316) |
8. The vendor is readily available to
assist staff with questions
and software support. |
74% (309) |
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